RoBARDS v. LAMB
Syllabus
RoBARDS v. LAMB. ■ ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI. No. 1088. Submitted March 20, 1888. Decided April 16, 1888. The Statute of Missouri which, as construed by the Supreme Court of that State, authorizes a special administrator, having charge of the estate of a testator pending a contest as to the validity of his will, to have a final settlement of his accounts, conclusive against distributees, without giving notice to them, is not repugnant to the clause of the Constitution of the United States which forbids a State to deprive any person of his property without due process of law. This case was brought before the court on the following motions made by defendant m error’s counsel. The court is moved to dismiss the writ of error or to afBrm the judgment herein on the following ground^: 1. This court is without jurisdiction under § 709 of the Revised Statutes. 2. If any question cognizable under that section was in fact decided, such, decision was not necessary, and the judgment rendered is supported on grounds which this court has no jurisdiction to review. Gr. Gr. Test, For Defendant in Error. The case, as stated by the court, was as follows: By the statutes of Missouri, relating to the granting of letters testamentary and of administration, it is provided: “ If the validity of a will be contested, or the executor be a minor or absent from the State, letters of administration shall be granted, during the time of such contest, minority or absence, to some ot
Full Opinion (2,212 characters)
Mr. Justice Harlan, after stating the facts in the above language, delivered the opinion of the court. The only question, among those presented, of which this court can take cognizance, is whether the statute of Missouri, which authorizes a special administrator having charge of the estate of a testator pending a contest as to the validity of his will, to have a final settlement of his accounts, without giving notice to distributees, and which settlement, in the absence of fraud, is deemed conclusive as against such distributees, is repugnant to the clause of the Constitution of the United States forbidding a State to deprive any person of his property without due process of law. We have no difficulty in answering this question in the negative. Without stating all the grounds upon which this conclusion might be rested, it is sufficient 'to say that, in matters involved in the accounts of such special ' administrator, the executor or administrator with the will annexed represents all claiming under the will. The regular representative of the estate, before passing his receipt to the special administrator, has an opportunity to examine this settlement, and, if it is not' satisfactory, to contest its correctness by some appropriate proceeding. When an executor or administrator with the will annexed proposes to make a final settlement of his own accounts, he is required to give notice to creditors and distributees; for there are' ho other representatives of the estate. But when a special administrator ceases to act as such, that is, when his functions cease by operation of law, he must account for the property and estate in his hands to the executor or administrator with the will, annexed, who, in receiving what had been temporarily in the charge of the,former, acts for all interested in the distribution of the estate. As, therefore, the regular representative of the estate has an opportunity to contest- the final settlement of the special administrator, before giving him an acquittance, it cannot ' be said that the absence of notice to the distributees of such settlement amounts to a deprivation of their rights of property without, due process of law. The judgment is affirmed.
Source: Caselaw Access Project (Harvard Law School). This page is informational and is not legal advice.