Walker et al. v. Smith
Syllabus
Walker et al. v. Smith. Factor. — Damages. One who accepts a consignment, is liable in damages for a breach of instructions, though his services' were rendered gratuitously. Where there is a legal measure of damages, the jury are bound by it, though the action sound in tort. Case. On the trial of this cause, the following facts appeared: The plaintiffs were merchants of London ; and in March 1796, shipped and consigned to the defendant certain goods, invoiced at 270?. 14s. 8d. sterling, accompanied with a letter, stating that “ these goods were shipped by order of Mr. J. B., and for his account; and he was to remit ns the amount, on his arrival at Philadelphia: but' since they were shipped, some circumstances have occurred, which have created some doubts in our minds, respecting his solidity ; and by the advice of our friends, we have adopted this method to secure ourselves, through your friendly assistance, which we request on this occasion. As we do not want to deprive B. of the benefits to be derived from the sale of these goods, we wish you to hold them at his disposal, but not to deliver them to him, without being paid for the amount, or having such security given you therefor, as is satisfactory to yourself. Should he not be able to effect either of these, in a reasonable time, we would wish you to dispose of them for our account, and remit us the amount in good bills.” The defendant duly received the goods, but delivered them over to B., without receiving payment, or e
Full Opinion (2,380 characters)
The Court, in their charge to the jury, expressly declared an opinion, that, on the evidence, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the full amount of the original debt, with such reasonable compensation for the delay of payment, as the jury should think proper. The jury, however, gave a verdict for only §468.44, which was the amount of the plaintiffs’ demand (after crediting the remittance), estimating the sterling money at par, allowing the defendant a commission, and deducting the interest. The jury added, that the plaintiffs should pay the costs. *The plaintiffs’ counsel then moved for a new trial, because the r*gai verdict was against law, evidence and the charge of the court: but L after argument, the motion was overruled ; and it was observed by Washington, Justice, that although he was not satisfied with the verdict, nor should he have assented to it as a juror ; yet, the question of damages, or of interest in the nature of damages, belonged so peculiarly to the jury, that he could not allow himself to invade their province ; while he felt a determination to prevent on their part, any invasion of the judicial province of the court. For the report of the case, on the motion for a new trial, see 1 W. C. C. 202. For a full report of the charge of Washington, J., see 1 W. C. C. 153. 5) It appears by the record, that the action was brought to October Sessions 1801, and that the declaration was in assumpsit, with the following counts, two in indebitatus assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered and for money had and received, and one quantum valebant. The finding of the jury, that the plaintiffs should pay the costs, was, at once, abandoned by the defendant’s counsel, on general principles; but Ingersoll stated, that the first judicial law provided, that the plaintiff should not be allowed costs, if he -ecovered a sum less than $500 (6 vol. 16, § 3; 1 vol. 61, § 20); and that although the action was instituted, when the sum required, in that respect, was only $400 ; yet he referred to a decision of Judge Chase, in the circuit court of Delaware, which pronounced, that the act repealing the latter provision, revived the former, and was to be applied to all suits, present or future. Dallas referred, however, to the acts of congress (5 vol. 237, § 11; 6 vol. 16, §4). And the court declared that the plaintiffs were clearly entitled to costs.
Source: Caselaw Access Project (Harvard Law School). This page is informational and is not legal advice.